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1. Introduction
“The trouble with him was that he was with-
out imagination. He was quick and alert in the 
things of life, but only in the things, and not in 
the significances”. (London, 1998) (p. 342)
To read narrative, and especially fictional narrative, we must be unlike the un-
named protagonist of Jack London’s ([1908] 1998) famous short story “To Build a 
Fire.” We must remain “quick and alert” to things that are not given in the here and 
now but evoked in f leeting acts of the imagination. We must be able to entertain 
“significances”—of words, to begin with, and of events, characters, and plots as 
well. While London’s protagonist would not make a good reader, he—and the sto-
ry in which he is the only human character—make an intriguing case study for a 
chapter on how the body affects the reading of fictional narrative in prose. Surely, 
the imaginative acts through which we translate texts into vivid mental experi-
ences are intangible. If we observe a reader reading a novel, we won’t see much 
going on in bodily terms: the repetitive gesture of turning the pages, shifts in 
posture and perhaps a few occasional changes in location are all the bodily move-
ments we will see—and they seem hardly relevant to the novel’s subject-matter. 
Yet there is more to reading than meets the eye—even with regard to embodiment. 
The human body, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty wrote in his seminal Phenomenology 
of Perception, is far more than what can be externally observed; it is a “center of 
potential action” (2002, p. 121). Perhaps reading narrative involves a number of 
potential actions—that is, actions that are not actualized and remain invisible 
from the outside. As scholars working in the field of cognitive literary studies are 
beginning to realize (see Caracciolo & Kukkonen, 2014), our responses to fiction 
are deeply shaped by our embodied make-up. In fiction, the reader has no per-
ceptual access to actual bodies (as would be the case in film or drama) and draws 
exclusively on the resources of his or her own body to make sense of the text.
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In the mind sciences, evidence for the embodiment of reading has been grow-
ing steadily over the last two decades, as part of a broader interest in embodied 
cognition: namely, the ways in which our cognitive processes are informed by our 
being biological creatures with a body of a certain size and shape (see Gibbs, 2005; 
Gallagher, 2005). We know, in other words, that literary reading involves a set of 
psychological schemata and past somatic experiences that we bring along as we 
cross the boundary between everyday reality and the imaginary domains of fic-
tion. At the same time, prose narrative can also shape people’s understanding and 
interpretation of the body, contributing to what this collection discusses under 
the heading of the “medial body.” This is what I aim to show in the final part of this 
chapter, where I turn to how—via literary interpretation—characters’ bodies can 
be reabsorbed into everyday experience; but before that, I must say more on how 
fiction can trigger embodied schemata at a more basic, cognitive level. 
In fact, one of the goals of this chapter is to explore the interaction between 
cognitive and cultural perspectives on the body. I do so by drawing a heuristic dis-
tinction between four levels of analysis, or four levels at which the body matters 
in literary reading: language, story, discourse, and interpretation. These concepts 
have a long history in literary studies, but let me define them succinctly (and, no 
doubt, simplistically) here for the reader’s benefit. By language, I mean the sty-
listic texture of literary narrative—the choices made by the author in terms of 
words, register, syntax, and so on. According to a basic distinction in narratology 
(Chatman, 1978), story is the “content” of narrative and can be expressed through 
wh-words: what happens to whom, where, and why. Discourse is the “how” of the 
story—that is, as theorized by Meir Sternberg (2001; more on this below), the way 
in which the author decides to present it, often by withholding information from 
the reader in order to create effects such as the suspense, curiosity, and surprise. 
Finally, interpretation is how readers make sense of a particular story by connect-
ing it with their own interests and with questions circulating in their culture. 
I will show that all these levels of narrative are impacted by the fact that we are 
biological, embodied beings and not, for example, AI programs running on silicon 
circuits. London’s (1998) “To Build a Fire” will be my case study. Even though, as 
we will see, this short story places specific emphasis on the body—and is therefore 
well-suited to a body-oriented approach—many of the cognitive and experiential 
processes I will outline are so basic to narrative understanding that they are at 
work in engaging with any narrative text. “To Build a Fire” thus serves as a guide 
in my discussion, but the responses and levels of engagement I examine in what 
follows can be extrapolated to the medial environment created by prose fiction, 
or even by verbal narrative more generally. The continuity between fictional and 
nonfictional narrative practices, in terms of their embodied underpinnings, helps 
explain “faction” qua the convergence between fictional and nonfictional storytell-
ing (as posited in the introduction of this volume).
Embodying the Reader 207
2. Language
“To Build a Fire” is the story of a man who ventures out in the frozen landscape of 
the Yukon Territories, accompanied only by a husky. The man’s stated purpose is 
to “take a look at the possibilities of getting out logs in the spring from the islands 
in the Yukon” (London, 1998, p. 342). With a temperature of -75 F (-59 C), this en-
vironment is so inhospitable that it poses a constant threat to the man’s survival. 
Hence, the story reads like a record of an increasingly deadly struggle between the 
character and his surroundings. Eventually, the man dies from hypothermia after 
failing repeatedly to kindle a fire. The animal plays an important role in the man’s 
confrontation with nature: the narrator subtly calls attention to the foolishness of 
the man’s decision to set out without a human companion; the husky is a creature 
whose body has been shaped by evolution to survive in this harsh climate. Both 
the narrator’s implicit critique of the man and the husky’s endurance underscore 
what the man, because of his lack of imagination, does not realize: namely, the 
frailty of the human species and of human bodies in particular. In fact, we read 
that the man’s f lawed understanding of his situation “did not lead him to meditate 
upon his frailty as a creature of temperature, and upon man’s frailty in general, 
able only to live within certain narrow limits of heat and cold; and from there on 
it did not lead him to the conjectural field of immortality and man’s place in the 
universe” (ibid.). 
The story translates this insight into a concrete situation, focusing on the 
character’s body and how it attempts—and, ultimately, fails—to cope with an 
extremely dangerous environment. The reader is no mere spectator of this strug-
gle, however, since London’s prose involves her in the protagonist’s predicament 
through a large number of embodied cues. By “embodied cues” I mean any textual 
device capable of eliciting a bodily response in readers, whether this response is 
unconscious (i.e., not felt subjectively but detectable in psychological studies) or 
fully conscious. (I will return to this distinction between unconscious and con-
scious responses in a moment.)
Consider, for example, the following passage. Halfway through his hike, the 
man decides to stop to eat: 
He unbuttoned his jacket and shirt and drew forth his lunch. The action consumed 
no more than a quarter of a minute, yet in that brief moment the numbness laid 
hold of the exposed fingers. He did not put the mitten on, but, instead, struck the 
fingers a dozen sharp smashes against his leg. (ibid., p. 346) 
This passage relates a number of bodily actions: unbuttoning the jacket, taking 
out the food, striking the fingers against the leg to stimulate the blood circulation. 
None of these gestures is described in detail; yet, according to psycholinguistic 
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and neuroscientific evidence, even these sketchy verbs will trigger an embodied 
response in readers—via a phenomenon known as “embodied simulation.” For 
instance, Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) asked participants to read sentences that 
contained verbs implying movement either away from or towards the body (e.g., 
respectively, “Put your finger under the faucet” and “Put your finger under your 
nose”). The participants were instructed to judge whether the sentences made 
sense or not; in order to answer, they had to make a movement that was either 
similar to the verbally represented movement or opposite to it.
Glenberg and Kaschak found that response times were higher—i.e., partic-
ipants were less responsive—when the action they were asked to perform was 
inconsistent with the action they had just read about (e.g., they read a sentence 
representing a movement away from the body and were expected to respond by 
moving their hand towards their own body). This can be interpreted as an interfer-
ence effect: “when the implied direction of the sentence contrasts with the actual 
response direction, there is interference” (2002, p. 561). What exactly is causing 
this interference? Glenberg and Kaschak’s theory is that “language understanding 
taps into an action-based system” (ibid.). The cognitive process activated by read-
ing these sentences shares some of the neural underpinnings of the relevant ac-
tions (in this case, movement away from or movement towards the body). Hence, 
after a movement away from the body had been mentally triggered by the verbal 
stimulus (even if it hadn’t been actually carried out), participants took a longer 
time to make the opposite movement because they had to switch from the “away” 
to the “towards” system. This finding ties in with neuroimaging evidence showing 
that when we read action verbs implying (for instance) hand motion the brain ar-
eas associated with actual hand motion light up (Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 
2004). To explain these results, mind scientists posit that language understanding 
involves a form of embodied simulation—a mental enactment of the bodily ac-
tion that we would perform if this were a real-world situation, not just a linguistic 
representation. Here is, again, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the body as a “center of 
potential action” (2002).
Arguably, all the actions performed by the character in London’s short story—
unbuttoning, drawing forth, striking—will be understood, via embodied simula-
tion, as potentialities of our own body. London’s text focuses on concrete actions 
such as moving through space, interacting with human-scale objects (when the 
character attempts to build a fire), and so on. This phenomenon is, of course, not 
limited to this passage: in fact, embodied simulations are implicated in any kind 
of language processing, in fiction but also in everyday, factual communication. In 
London’s story, as in other narratives, such simulations are unlikely to emerge in 
readers’ consciousness: like a musical accompaniment, they set an embodied tone 
while remaining far from the center of our attention. To understand why this sto-
ry is so rich in bodily effects, we need to turn to other dimensions of embodiment.
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3. Story
Under the heading of “story,” I focus on the characters of a narrative, the spac-
es they inhabit, and the actions they perform. Narrative needs a cast of charac-
ters, who are typically humans or animate beings (such as London’s husky). In 
most scenarios, readers will take these characters to possess bodies analogous to 
the bodies we encounter in everyday life. While seemingly trivial, this fact is not 
without consequences in a medium like prose narrative, where everything about 
characters—including their bodies—has to be imagined by readers: in film or the-
ater, for example, we can directly perceive the actors’ bodies on the screen or on 
stage; in prose, where there is no such perceptual directness, we have to embody 
the characters ourselves—that is, we have to provide them with a body through 
constant imaginative acts. Not all these acts are the same, however, depending 
largely on the kind of textual information we receive. For instance, in an episode 
of London’s story the dog steps on a pool covered only by a thin layer of ice, which 
cracks under the animal’s weight: 
It had wet its fore-feet and legs, and almost immediately the water that clung to it 
turned to ice. It made quick ef forts to lick the ice of f its legs, then dropped down 
in the snow and began to bite out the ice that had formed between the toes. (1998, 
p. 346)
Not only does understanding these lines trigger embodied simulations of actions, 
such as licking, dropping down, and biting, but it encourages us to form a sketchy 
mental image of the dog’s body. Note, however, that there is nothing in this pas-
sage that requires taking the dog’s perspective on its own body: these gestures 
could be easily observed by a bystander, and in fact, we’re led to think that the 
protagonist of London’s story did watch the dog’s movements in this way. 
Contrast the description of the dog with the following passage, which occurs 
after the man has himself fallen into the frozen water and decides to build a fire 
to dry his clothes. The man knows that, at this outside temperature, wet clothes 
can be deadly: 
[It] was surprising, the rapidity with which his cheeks and nose were freezing. And 
he had not thought his fingers could go lifeless in so short a time. Lifeless they were, 
for he could scarcely make them move together to grip a twig, and they seemed 
remote from his body and from him. When he touched a twig, he had to look and 
see whether or not he had hold of it. The wires were pretty well down between him 
and his finger-ends. (ibid., pp. 349–350)
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This can be no external description of the man’s body. For one thing, the “surprise” 
mentioned at the beginning of the passage is the man’s own surprise at seeing the 
cold spread through his face and hands so quickly. The numbness and remote-
ness described by the third sentence are, again, not sensations that an observer 
could easily infer on the basis of perceptual cues. The fourth sentence (“When he 
touched a twig”) makes this perfectly clear: the fact that the man does not know 
without looking whether he has the twig or not signals a breakdown in his sense 
of touch which, in turn, implies that as readers we’re experiencing this scene from 
the man’s perspective, not from a bystander’s. In narrative theory, this phenome-
non is known as “internal focalization” (see Jahn, 1996): the text focuses on expe-
riences and sensations that are by definition private, or that are apprehended at 
such a level of detail that they seem to emanate directly from the character’s con-
sciousness. We thus become privy to the character’s experience of his own body, 
in ways that are fundamentally unlike the account of the dog’s attempts to remove 
the ice from his paws. 
Why is this point relevant to our discussion of the reader’s embodiment? Be-
cause, as the story explores a character’s bodily sensations in internal focalization, 
readers may develop a sense of “taking on” his or her body: in reading texts such 
as London’s, they may not just imagine the protagonist’s body into existence, but 
they may imagine what it would be like for them to be in his shoes. This effect can be 
conceptualized as a form of bodily perspective-taking or empathy that creatively 
reutilizes readers’ past experiences (for instance, of extreme cold or numb limbs). 
Philosophers such as Berys Gaut (1999) and Amy Coplan (2004) have studied this 
kind of empathy for characters, though they do not focus specifically on its bodily 
underpinnings. Building on Gaut’s and Coplan’s work, I define empathy as a form 
of mental simulation whereby we imagine what it would be like to be in a certain 
situation or mental state. Yet, unlike what I’ve called “embodied simulation” in the 
previous section, empathy is a conscious form of simulation insofar as it emerges 
in readers’ consciousness.
To fully understand this point, we need to factor in the central role of men-
tal imagery in reading literary narrative, vis-à-vis narrative media such as film, 
in which audience members have direct perceptual access to characters’ bodies 
(and the storyworld more generally). A mental image is a conscious experience 
that is perception-like in character, despite the absence of the appropriate percep-
tual stimulus (see Thompson 2007). For instance, we can visualize a husky even if 
there is no husky in our visual field. While mental imagery is mostly associated 
with visual perception (as in the husky example), we can experience imagery in 
all other sensory modalities as well: we can imagine a sound or a smell or, closer 
to our focus here, we can imagine bodily sensations such as coldness, numbness, 
or pain. This is a relatively common experience: when a friend shows us a swollen 
finger after he accidentally crushed it with a hammer, we may well experience an 
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imaginary twitch of pain. Language can have a similar effect, and literary lan-
guage is known for its power to evoke vivid imagery, as shown by Elaine Scarry 
(2001) and Ellen Esrock (2004), among others. Sometimes this imagery may be 
triggered by the linguistic representation of bodily states, such as pain or proprio-
ception (awareness of one’s own position in space) or other feelings located in the 
body. The embodiment of this kind of imagery is straightforward. But even scenes 
relying mainly on vision are not disembodied, insofar as the bodily movements 
that accompany visual perception will normally be implicated—through mental 
imagery—in these passages (Caracciolo, 2013). When the imagery formed by the 
reader is an approximation of a character’s bodily experience, as portrayed by the 
text, we have what I am calling bodily empathy for the character.
London’s short story takes full advantage of this tendency towards bodily 
empathy for characters. In the narrative’s climactic scene, the fire the man has 
built to dry his clothes burns itself out, and the man realizes that he has very little 
time to make another fire before the extreme cold kills him. At this point, however, 
he has lost any sensitivity in (and control of) his hands, so that striking a match 
proves exceedingly difficult:
Next he brought out his bunch of sulphur matches. But the tremendous cold had 
already driven the life out of his fingers. In his ef fort to separate one match from 
the others, the whole bunch fell in the snow. He tried to pick it out of the snow, but 
failed. The dead fingers could neither touch nor clutch [...] He watched, using the 
sense of vision in place of that of touch, and when he saw his fingers on each side 
the bunch, he closed them—that is, he willed to close them, for the wires were 
down, and the fingers did not obey. He pulled the mitten on the right hand, and 
beat it fiercely against his knee. Then, with both mittened hands, he scooped the 
bunch of matches, along with much snow, into his lap. Yet he was no better of f. 
(1998, p. 352)
The protagonist’s ordinary embodiment breaks down—a fact symbolized by the 
metaphor “the wires were down,” in the sense that motor control is lost as if any 
communication between the brain and the hand had been cut off. As readers, we 
are likely to feel sympathy for the protagonist’s predicament: his survival depends 
on a single, and usually unproblematic, gesture (striking a match); we experience 
something akin to the protagonist’s dismay as he finds his fingers unresponsive. 
But this emotional response is likely to be accompanied by bodily empathy: Lon-
don’s narrative encourages us to take on the character’s perspective by enacting 
his fumbling gestures as he tries (and fails) to light a match, or as he looks at his 
own fingers, which he cannot feel. This kind of empathy involves what Anežka 
Kuzmičová (2014) calls “enactment imagination,” which she distinguishes from 
other kinds of mental imagery whereby we experience a story’s events and charac-
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ters from an external viewpoint: in enactment imagination, readers imaginatively 
enact or perform the inner experience they are ascribing to a character. 
Whether enactment imagination develops or not depends on both textual fac-
tors and readers’ predispositions. Certainly, a story like London’s “To Build a Fire” 
is especially conducive to this kind of response, because of the constant atten-
tion being paid to the protagonist’s bodily experience. The narrative constructs a 
space that is centered on the man’s body: if it is so effective at conveying what the 
Yukon is like—its “sense of place,” as geographers would say (Foote & Azaryahu, 
2009)—it is largely because we’re given the chance to experience this frozen land-
scape through the (embodied) mediation of the protagonist. Readers’ experience 
is made to coincide, in their imagination, with the body they attribute to the char-
acter. The way in which the space of the story discloses itself to readers is thus 
closely bound up with bodily patterns; it builds on low-level, automatic embodied 
simulations of the kind we have explored in the previous section in order to give 
rise to a fully conscious experience of taking on the character’s body.
4. Discourse
The forms of bodily involvement we have discussed so far are directed at charac-
ters and at the actions they perform and may lead readers to develop an illusion of 
presence in the spatial setting of the narrative. These are all aspects of the “story” 
in the narrow sense. Narratologists have long distinguished the story proper from 
the formal strategies through which it is presented, with the latter being referred 
to as “discourse” (see, e.g., Chatman, 1978). The distinction between story and dis-
course can be further illustrated through the widely used “storyworld” metaphor: 
the story is the world-like domain in which we understand the events recounted by 
the narrative (involving what characters, for what reasons, and in what locations, 
etc.); the discourse, by contrast, is the verbal or at least semiotic presentation of 
that storyworld. Could it be that readers’ engagement with discourse is also based 
on bodily experience? Answering this question is less intuitive than it was for the 
story, whose elements all bear a clear relationship to the body (since characters 
have a body, space is normally apprehended through our bodies, etc.). Discourse is 
by definition more conceptual: it is the logic of the telling, the order and manner in 
which the events and actions of the story have been arranged by the storyteller in 
order to bring about certain effects on the audience. Yet there are ways of showing 
that even readers’ understanding of discourse is shaped by the body: in previous 
work (Caracciolo, 2014b), I identified two strategies for closing this gap, calling 
them the “experiential” and “cognitive-linguistic” approach.
Let us start with the former. I will build on the account offered by two schol-
ars, Meir Sternberg and David Velleman, whose work on narrative discourse an-
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ticipates my experiential approach, although they have not spelled out fully its 
implications from an embodied perspective. According to Meir Sternberg (2001), 
narrative is defined by a double temporality: the temporality of the story, which 
is the inferred chronology of the events told by the narrative; and the temporality 
of discourse, which is the order of presentation of those events (and may deviate 
significantly from the order in which the events happened). The discrepancy be-
tween story and discourse time is responsible for three emotional effects of narra-
tive—effects so widespread that Sternberg calls them “narrative universals”: they 
are suspense, curiosity, and surprise. In suspense, we wonder about the outcome 
of an action sequence that is located in the future of story time (e.g., will char-
acter X die?). In curiosity, we wonder about a piece of information that has been 
omitted by the discourse but is located in the past of story time (character Y was 
killed, but who is the murderer?). Finally, in surprise, we’re forced to revise our 
understanding of the story because of the delayed revelation of a fact or a past 
event (if character Z was already dead at the time of the murder, then he couldn’t 
have killed Y). Like all emotions, suspense, curiosity, and surprise may have an af-
fective (and therefore embodied) component: they may—and indeed typically do—
lead to distinct bodily feelings. Suspense, for instance, has something in common 
with holding one’s breath, curiosity may be experienced as a tingling sensation, 
surprise as a sharp jolt. While the exact nature of these feelings may vary from 
reader to reader, and from case to case, these examples demonstrate how the ways 
in which we respond to the progression of narrative—to its discourse—are more 
embodied than we may think at first. Philosopher David Velleman puts this point 
as follows: “The cadence that makes for a story is that of the arousal and resolution 
of affect, a pattern that is biologically programmed. Hence we understand sto-
ries viscerally, with our bodies” (2003, p. 13). Sternberg’s suspense, curiosity, and 
surprise are emotional effects that complicate and enrich the “cadence” posited 
by Velleman. 
Consider London’s “To Build a Fire”: the first pages of the short story create 
certain expectations in readers, who quickly grasp the danger in which the reck-
less protagonist finds himself. These expectations are affective as well as concep-
tual: not only do we mentally entertain the scenario of the protagonist’s death, but 
we experience a sense of apprehension arising from that scenario; this bodily feel-
ing drives our interest in the story. When the protagonist falls into a pool of icy 
water, the danger becomes more concrete and our apprehension turns into full-
f ledged suspense and dread at the man’s seemingly inevitable demise. The long, 
painstaking descriptions of the man trying (calmly at first, desperately after his 
initial attempts fail) to build a fire only exacerbate the suspense by delaying the 
outcome of the story. The man’s eventual death is the “resolution,” to use Velle-
man’s term. Therefore, the narrative progression can be described as a series of 
gradual shifts in bodily affect: from the vague sense of foreboding created by the 
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opening pages to the suspense rising as the protagonist’s situation deteriorates; 
this feeling plateaus out when we witness the man’s failure to overcome the main 
obstacle to his survival (the wet clothes); finally, it dwindles to a core of wistful 
interest in the man’s fate after his death. London’s story is clearly quite linear in 
its progression—hence its illustrative value—but longer and more sophisticated 
narratives can greatly complicate these embodied dynamics. Through this experi-
ential approach, even something as apparently abstract as discourse can be con-
nected to the body: like music, narrative gives rise to a certain rhythm that is felt 
in bodily terms.
Another possibility for embodying narrative discourse builds on the notion of 
“image schemata,” which is one of the cornerstones of cognitive linguistics—a field 
that has emerged in the wake of Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) inf luential work on 
metaphor. In this tradition, an image schema is a pattern deriving from percep-
tual and bodily experience (for discussion, see Hampe, 2005). A classic example is 
the idea of a “path,” which arises from our experience of moving through space. 
Lakoff and Johnson’s intuition was that patterns like a path are typically used to 
structure abstract concepts, for instance in the following sentence from an online 
magazine: “the path for Palestinian freedom and statehood has been  obstruct-
ed by Israel’s continuing policy of occupying and colonizing Palestinian territory” 
(Shaath, 2010). These words combine two image schemata—path (to Palestinian 
freedom) and obstacle (Israel’s policy)—in a way that translates relatively ab-
stract concepts and intangible entities into a concrete scenario: a goal-directed 
movement is halted by a physical obstacle. Other examples of image schemata are 
“up-down,” “equilibrium,” “superimposition,” or “cycle” (for a more extensive in-
ventory, see Evans & Green, 2006, p. 190). These are all perceptual patterns that 
underlie human conceptualization in a wide variety of contexts. 
Narrative structure itself can be seen as building on such image schema-
ta. Cognitive literary scholar Michael Kimmel (2005; 2009) makes a convincing 
case for this idea, though his hypotheses would have to be tested in experimental 
studies. For instance, Kimmel (2005) analyzes the plot of Joseph Conrad’s Heart of 
Darkness in terms of an image-schematic opposition between Western culture and 
Africa; within this structure Kimmel identifies a number of other image schema-
ta, including the “path” (the protagonist’s journey into the heart of darkness), the 
“attraction” exerted by Africa, and the “barrier” the protagonist has to overcome. 
As Kimmel suggests, image schemata are at the root of the affective contours that 
accompany our experience of narrative discourse: “Such image schemas can be 
sensed by readers, often in their bodies, as an arc of FORCE tension or denoue-
ment as reinstated BALANCE schema (Johnson, 1993), as electromyography of 
readers suggests (Malmo 1975)” (Kimmel, 2009, p. 173). This is made particularly 
evident in London’s short story by the fact that the progression of the narrative 
largely coincides with the protagonist’s path-like movement in space: when the 
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man has to stop after falling into a pond of icy water, the extreme cold becomes 
an almost physical obstacle to his journey (and to the larger journey that is his life). 
Discourse structures can thus be analyzed as an array of dynamic tensions and 
oppositions that are linked, experientially and/or conceptually, with embodied 
modes of interaction with the world. Of course, the relationship between image 
schemata and embodiment is looser and more metaphorical than readers’ empa-
thetic engagement with characters’ bodies; but this cognitive-linguistic approach 
is still important in that it shows how narrative structure, even understood at an 
abstract level, can be grounded in schemata that are experientially derived.
5. Interpretation
So far, I have discussed readers’ embodied involvement in terms of simulative 
responses to action verbs, empathy for characters, and bodily feelings and im-
age-schematic structures emerging from narrative discourse. These are relatively 
basic and universal responses, but we should not forget that our body is an ex-
tremely complex machine, whose workings are regulated by culture as well as by 
biological factors and cognitive predispositions: as Mark Johnson puts it, 
our bodies are constituted […] by cultural artifacts, practices, institutions, rituals, 
and modes of interaction that transcend and shape any particular body and any 
particular bodily action. These cultural dimensions include gender, race, class (so-
cioeconomic status), aesthetic values, and various modes of bodily posture and 
movement. (2008, p. 175–76)
A principled account of embodiment in reading should take this cultural dimen-
sion into account, insofar as socio-cultural conceptions of the body are likely to 
significantly affect the ways in which readers interpret narrative. These concep-
tions may ref lect the author’s and reader’s culture as well as personal experiences. 
Daniel Punday’s work yields a number of insights into this level of embodiment, 
resulting in a “corporeal hermeneutics—a theory of how the text can be meaning-
fully articulated through the body” (2003, p. 5). 
London’s “To Build a Fire” can, once again, help illustrate this idea. The title is a 
quintessential example of a bodily action. As soon as it becomes clear that the sto-
ry’s outcome depends on the man’s inability to build a fire, the title takes on ironic 
overtones. In turn, this irony ties in with the narrator’s already quoted ref lection 
on “man’s frailty in general, able only to live within certain narrow limits of heat 
and cold” (London, 1998, p. 342). The protagonist meets his demise because, in his 
foolishness, he oversteps these limits, entering a territory where the human body 
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does not work as we would expect it to: even the basic embodied action of building 
a fire becomes impossible. 
This reading can be further complicated by factoring in the other body that ap-
pears in this short story—namely, the nonhuman body of the husky. Jack London 
was deeply inf luenced by Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection (see 
Berkove, 2004): throughout his work, he explored the ruthless individualism and 
struggle for survival that—in London’s view—underlie human societies as well 
as animal life. Thus, in the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter the 
narrator of “To Build a Fire” emphasizes that the man’s death is caused by his lack 
of imagination, which compounds the evolutionary unfitness of his body to with-
stand this extreme cold. By contrast, huskies are well-adapted to this weather and 
know instinctually how to survive in it (by burrowing under the snow, we are told 
repeatedly). A few instants before dying, the man even feels “a great surge of envy 
as he regarded the creature [the dog] that was warm and secure in its natural cov-
ering” (London, 1998, p. 351). The dog does not know how to build a fire: it appreci-
ates the fire’s warmth but does not appear to need it in order to survive. After the 
man’s death, the focalization switches to the husky. Initially puzzled by the man’s 
decision to lie down and “sleep,” the dog eventually smells “the scent of death” and 
understands what happened. The story’s last sentence reads: “[the husky] turned 
and trotted up the trail in the direction of the camp it knew, where were the other 
food-providers and fire-providers” (ibid. p. 357). The animal’s nonchalant “trot” is 
an ironic comment on the man’s foolishness. In this way, the short story employs 
the animal’s body—which is governed by simple but effective instincts—as a foil 
to the man’s hubris: even humans’ reliance on technology (of which fire is an ar-
chetype) cannot protect them from their own frail bodies and lack of judgment. 
As this brief discussion only begins to show, the body serves in narrative as 
an interpretive hotspot: the representation of characters’ bodies is bound up with 
a wide array of cultural evaluations and judgments, which readers negotiate in 
dialogue with the author’s creative choices and with their own (partly personal, 
partly culturally derived) interests and predispositions. The bodies represented 
by narrative—in the case of London’s short story, the human body of the man and 
the nonhuman body of the husky—thus participate in readers’ construction of in-
terpretive meanings, which in turn may shape and deepen their understanding 
of various forms of embodiment (human and nonhuman) outside of narrative. The 
cognitive-level responses I have discussed in the first part of the article are always 
already entangled with cultural meanings at this level, and in fact, embodied in-
volvement in prose narrative (through empathy for characters or absorption in the 
plot) may encourage readers to engage with cultural representations and evalua-
tions of the body. For instance, work on “narrative persuasion” by psychologists 
Melanie Green and Timothy Brock (2000) suggests that empathy and immersion 
correlate with the extent to which readers’ beliefs are changed by narrative. This 
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process feeds into what this collection refers to as the “medial body”—that is, the 
way in which our ordinary forms of embodiment are shaped and constituted by 
mediated practices. 
6. Conclusion
Reading may seem removed from the domain of the everyday, embodied action 
and interaction; it may have been conceptualized in Western culture as the in-
tellectual pursuit par excellence, but it still involves our bodies in ways that can 
no longer be ignored. Our imagination of, and engagement with, the storyworlds 
of fiction build on our embodiment through the mechanisms examined in this 
chapter: embodied simulations, bodily empathy, somatic feelings, body-oriented 
readings, and evaluations. Thus, the conception of embodiment articulated in this 
chapter spans a wide spectrum, from relatively basic responses to language, up 
to sophisticated cultural evaluations (for more on this spectrum, see Caracciolo, 
2014a). In literary reading—as in any other human practice—embodiment oper-
ates at multiple levels, which can be probed only through careful interdisciplin-
ary work. Not only that: literature can encourage us to adopt, in our imagination, 
bodies different from our own. When London’s short story switches, at the end 
of the narrative, from the man’s to the dog’s consciousness, this shift in internal 
focalization invites us to engage with the animal’s embodied perspective on the 
storyworld. In “To Build a Fire” this is just a local effect, too short-lived to create 
a strong feeling of identification with the animal’s body, but fiction can do much 
more than this. As we read in J. M. Coetzee’s novella The Lives of Animals, some 
kinds of literature ask us to “imagine our way into [the animal’s] way of moving, 
to inhabit [its] body” (1999, p. 51). Nor is this effect limited to animal narratives: 
in reading, we can come to inhabit a disabled body, or a body of a different gen-
der or sexual orientation. This illusion—which may well have an effect on our re-
al-world beliefs and attitudes—depends on the author’s skillful use of embodied 
cues, which draw our real bodies into the narrative even as they effect a number 
of subtle changes in our imagination of the body.
This dynamic is made possible by the fact that the body is not a fixed entity 
but a bundle of potentialities. While grounded in our biological body, our “medial 
body”—the concept at the center of this collection—can be reshaped by culture 
and by imaginative acts, such as those we perform when engaging with narrative 
in prose and other media. The body thus becomes an infinitely complex membrane 
between biology, cognition, and culture. Fiction is valuable because it can hold a 
mirror up to this complexity, yielding insight into the multidimensional nature of 
embodiment.
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